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Abstract
The American Psychiatric Association and academic psychiatry in the United
States have two conflicts of interest that may affect their assessment of psychiatric
drugs and their development of diagnostic and clinical care guidelines: payments
from pharmaceutical companies and guild interests. Until recently, the proposed
solution to industry-academic relationships has been transparency. However,
cognitive dissonance research reveals that disclosure is not a solution because
cognitive biases are commonplace and difficult to eradicate. Indeed, bias is most
often manifest in subtle ways unbeknownst to the researcher or clinician, and thus
is usually implicit and unintentional. Also, recent studies suggest that disclosure of
financial conflicts of interest may actually worsen bias. In this paper we discuss the
implications of cognitive dissonance theory for understanding why disclosure or
even “management” of financial conflicts of interest are not robust enough
solutions to guarantee objectivity and prevent bias. We suggest that as a gold
standard commercial ties should be eliminated in settings where new drugs are
being tested and assessed, or clinical guidelines are being developed. This solution
will require the use of multidisciplinary teams to do these tasks, including
methodologists in addition to psychiatrists.

Keywords: Institutional corruption, psychiatry, cognitive dissonance, conflict of
interest, guild interest, bias, disclosure
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Introduction
Cognitive dissonance theory provides a framework for understanding why financial
and intellectual conflicts of interest can result in biased clinical decision-making
and why transparency—the disclosure of such conflicts—does not provide an
adequate remedy to the conflict. In short, cognitive dissonance studies reveal that
individuals who have a financial conflict of interest, or are working within an
institution that has come under the economic influence of an outside group, often
cannot consciously see how the conflict may be compromising their behavior.
Seventy five years ago, Upton Sinclair summed up this ethical blind spot well: “It’s
difficult to get a man to understand something if his salary depends upon his not
understanding it.”1

The Hidden Mind
Cognitive dissonance theory grew out of research intent on understanding what
people do when they are confronted with information that creates conflicted
psychological states. Although Leon Festinger’s original cognitive dissonance
theory from 1957 has been revised multiple times, the basic premise remains that
individuals experience cognitive dissonance when their behavior is at odds with
their ethical beliefs, or when they are trying to hold incompatible thoughts.2
Individuals experiencing cognitive dissonance have a desire to reduce their feelings
of discomfort by attempting to reconcile their conflicting beliefs and behaviors, or
their incompatible thoughts, especially if the dissonance is esteem-related (e.g., is
related to how one sees oneself professionally). For instance, if a physician is a
paid by a drug company to act as a consultant or speaker, that physician may need
to remain convinced that he or she is still objective about the merits of the
company’s drugs, in spite of the financial payment.
As Harvard psychologist Mazahrin Banaji and colleagues have empirically
demonstrated, a person is able to hold this self-protecting thought because implicit
1

Sinclair Lewis, I, Candidate for Governor: And How I Got Licked, (1935, reprint University of California Press,

1994); as cited by Wikiquotes, http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Upton_Sinclair.
2

Eddie Harmon-Jones, Judson Mills, eds., Cognitive Dissonance: Perspectives on a Pivotal Theory in Social

Psychology (American Psychological Association, 1999), 3-21.

EDMOND J. SAFRA RESEARCH LAB, HARVARD UNIVERSITY • FINDING SOLUTIONS TO
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION • COSGROVE & WHITAKER • MAY 9, 2013

4

biases, which can arise from financial conflicts, operate largely on the unconscious
mind.3 Thus, in the case described above, the physician is able to consciously
maintain a steadfast belief in his or her objectivity even while behaving in ways
that, to the outside observer, reveal that he or she has been affected by the
financial incentives. Individuals may consciously recognize their potential conflict of
interest while remaining unaware of how their behavior has been affected by it.
This is why even radical transparency of financial ties (e.g., receiving honoraria,
speaking fees, grant funding) cannot solve the pernicious problem of how such
conflicts of interest can influence decision-making at every stage in the research
process, and in the development of diagnostic and clinical care guidelines.4
Individuals with commercial ties and guild interests do not perceive that they are
acting in a compromised manner, and thus disclosure is not likely to change their
behavior, since they see themselves as unaffected by those financial conflicts.
Indeed, implicit biases, such as “pro-industry habits of thought,” are extremely
difficult to correct even when individuals are aware of them.5

6

As a result, financial conflicts, whether arising from payments by a third party
(such as a pharmaceutical company), or from guild interests, can lead researchers
to engage in distorted science (making methodological, statistical, or design
choices that may favor the company’s drug over placebo) and to develop
3

Mahzarin R. Banaji, Max H. Bazerman, and Dolly Chugh, “How (Un)ethical Are You?” Harvard Business Review

81.1 (2003): 56-65. Also, for more information on how fCOI primed a principal to unethical behavior, see
Maryam Kouchaki, Kristin Smith-Crowe, Arthur P. Brief, Carlos Sousa, “Seeing Green: Mere Exposure to
Money Triggers a Business Decision Frame and Unethical Outcomes,” Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes 212.1 (2013): 53-61,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749597812001380
4

Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) exert an enormous influence on prescription practices. They are seen by

the medical profession as more trustworthy than expert opinion, because they are an unbiased, empirically
derived set of recommendation statements. They are also seen as useful because they typically contain a
decision tree or algorithm to guide the busy clinician inundated with too much—and sometimes
contradictory—information. Thus, CPGs are intended to enhance the practice of evidence-based medicine by
streamlining healthcare delivery and improving the process and outcomes of patient care. Additionally,
insurance companies rely heavily on guidelines when deciding which treatments they will pay for, and
although there is no rule that CPGs must be used, they are seen as an integral part of evidence-based
medicine.
5

Joel Lexchin and Orla O’Donovan, “Prohibiting or ‘Managing’ Conflict of Interest?” Social Science and

Medicine 70.5 (2010): 643-647.
6

Curtis Hardin and Mazarin Banaji, “The Nature of Implicit Prejudice: Implications for Personal and Public

Policy,” in Eldar Shafir, ed., The Behavioral Foundations of Policy (Princeton University Press, 2012).
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imbalanced conclusions about the risk/benefit ratio of a class of medications,
without recognizing that they are doing so. Social psychologists refer to this
phenomenon as “confirmatory bias’—the tendency to look for evidence that
supports one’s prior beliefs or hypotheses. Furthermore, since the researchers see
themselves as objective, they are not conscious of this “confirmatory bias”
affecting their conclusions. The bias is both unintentional and unrecognized by the
researcher.
For example, although there was no research misconduct or fraud, re-evaluations
of liver tissue of rats exposed to the drug dioxin resulted in different conclusions
about the liver cancer in those rats. Compared to the original investigation, an
industry-sponsored re-evaluation identified fewer tissue slides as cancerous, and
this finding affected policy recommendations (water quality standards were
weakened.)7 This example is just one of many that point to a generic risk that a
financial conflict of interest may compromise research or undermine public trust.
Research by social psychologists and neuroscientists provide insight into the brain
processes that underlie cognitive dissonance. Decision-making involves not just
cognitive areas of the brain but emotional areas too. Imaging studies have shown
that there is an integration of cognitive processes with emotion-processing areas of
the brain such as the hippocampus and amygdala. The emotion-processing areas
influence this decision-making based on memories of previous experiences. As a
result, such emotional processing, which often occurs outside conscious
awareness, may be influenced by self-interest.8 This interplay of the conscious and
emotional areas of the brain allows conflicts of interest to affect decision-making in
a way that is hidden from the person making the decision.
Simon Young, co-editor in chief of Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience, summed
up this problem in this way: “The idea that scientists are objective seekers of truth

7

http://uwaterloo.academia.edu/HeatherDouglas/Papers/1029159/Rejecting_the_Ideal_of_Value-

Free_Science.
8

Paul Thagard, “The Moral Psychology of Conflicts of Interest: Insights from Affective Neuroscience,” Journal

of Applied Philosophy, 24.4 (2007): 367-380.

EDMOND J. SAFRA RESEARCH LAB, HARVARD UNIVERSITY • FINDING SOLUTIONS TO
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION • COSGROVE & WHITAKER • MAY 9, 2013

6

is a pleasing fiction, but counterproductive in so far as it can lessen vigilance
against bias.”9

Pharma’s Influence on Psychiatry
In recent years, there has been considerable societal attention paid to the fact that
financial conflicts of interest in psychiatry are pervasive. Indeed, they reach into
every corner of this medical discipline.
In 1980, when the American Psychiatric Association published the third edition of
its diagnostic and statistical manual (DSM III), it adopted a “medical model” for
classifying mental disorders, which was a change that, as Robert Spitzer, architect
of the manual later admitted, “delighted” the pharmaceutical industry.10 That same
year, the APA voted to allow pharmaceutical companies to sponsor scientific
symposiums at its annual conference, a decision that increased the flow of
pharmaceutical money into the organization. The APA’s annual revenues rose from
$10.5 million in 1980 to $65 million in 2008; in that last year, a minimum of $14
million came from pharmaceutical companies.11 This flow of industry money came
from pharmaceutical ads in the APA’s journals (American Journal of Psychiatry,
Psychiatric Times, and Psychiatric Services), sponsorship of scientific symposiums at
its annual conferences, advertising booths at those conferences, and various
“educational” grants.
The fact that the APA voted in 1980 to allow pharmaceutical companies to sponsor
scientific symposiums also opened the door for pharmaceutical companies to pay
academic psychiatrists to serve as expert speakers at such events. As a result,
academic psychiatrists came under the influence of pharmaceutical interests,
much as the APA did. By the mid 1990s, academic psychiatrists were receiving
industry payments to serve as speakers, consultants and advisors. Industry

9

Simon N. Young, “Bias in the Research Literature and Conflict of Interest: An Issue for Publishers, Editors,

Reviewers and Authors, And it is Not Just About the Money,” Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience 2009; 34.6
(2009): 412-417.
10

Jon Ronson, “Bipolar Kids: Victims of the ‘Madness Industry’?” New Scientist, June 8, 2011.

11

American Psychiatric Association, reports of the Treasurer, 1980 to 2004; Annual Reports of the American

Psychiatric Association, 2005-2011; American Psychiatric Association reports on pharmaceutical revenues,
2006-2011.
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insiders refer to these physicians as “thought leaders,” or “key opinion leaders”
(KOLs). This type of conflict of interest among academic psychiatrists became so
common that in 1998, when the New England Journal of Medicine sought to find an
“expert” to write a review of treatments for depression, it found it difficult to
identify one who didn’t have such ties.12
More recently, Propublica, an investigative journalism group that tracks payments
from 15 pharmaceutical firms to doctors for public speaking, found that from 2009
to 2012, at least 10 psychiatrists earned more than $500,000 giving such talks
(and for consulting services.) The top earner in the Propublica database was
Nashville psychiatrist Jon Draud, medical director of psychiatric medicine at two
Tennessee hospitals, who received more than $1 million from the firms that have
publicly disclosed such payments.13
Several states have passed laws (referred to as “sunshine laws”) that provide
insight into the extent of such financial ties at the local level. For instance, from
2002 to 2006, pharmaceutical firms gave $7.4 million to Minnesota psychiatrists.
The recipients included seven past presidents of the Minnesota Psychiatric Society
and 17 faculty psychiatrists at the University of Minnesota. All told, 187 of 571
psychiatrists in Minnesota received pharmaceutical money for some reason during
that five-year period.14
In addition, community psychiatrists may be given free samples, small gifts, and
paid trips to conferences from pharmaceutical companies. Until recently, residents
in medical schools regularly attended “educational” lunches sponsored by
pharmaceutical companies. “This ‘food, flattery, and friendship,’ as it has been
called, creates a sense of reciprocity in young doctors with long prescribing lives
ahead of them,” observed Marcia Angell, former editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine. “They naturally feel indebted to congenial people who keep giving them
gifts.”15
12

Marcia Angell, “Is Academic Medicine for Sale?” New England Journal of Medicine 342 (2000): 1516-1518.

13

Tracy Weber and Charles Ornstein “Dollars for Docs Mints a Millionaire,” ProPublica, March 11, 2013,

http://www.propublica.org/article/dollars-for-docs-mints-a-millionaire.
14

Jeremy Olson, “Drug Makers Step up Giving to Minnesota Psychiatrists,” Pioneer Press, August 27, 2007.

15

Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies: How they Deceive Us and What to Do About It, (Random

House, 2004): 127.
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Finally, editors of psychiatric journals may also be in conflicted situations insofar
as a majority of the advertisements in their journals typically come from
pharmaceutical companies. Publication of articles or studies that raise questions
about the efficacy or safety of psychotropic medications could threaten that
revenue stream. The peer-review process may be compromised if reviewers have
industry ties and are not aware of the ways in which those commercial ties can
subtly, but powerfully, result in “pro-industry habits of thought.”
In summary, conflicts of interest permeate the field. They appear when medical
students are in their residencies; they are present in the office of the community
psychiatrist; they help fund the operations of the American Psychiatric Association;
they help pay for medical journals; and there are close ties between academic
psychiatrists and pharmaceutical companies. As such, these conflicts may affect
the training of residents; the prescribing practices of community psychiatrists; the
writing of psychiatric textbooks (by the APA and their experts); the conduct of
research (e.g., study design, choice of outcome measure, statistical method used
for intent-to-treat designs, data analysis and interpretation, dissemination of the
research results, etc.); the setting of diagnostic boundaries for mental disorders;
and the formulation of clinical care guidelines.
This is a setting ripe for cognitive dissonance to settle deeply into the field: the
conflicts of interest almost certainly will impact the decision making of the APA,
academic psychiatrists, and prescribing psychiatrists, while these professionals, in
their conscious minds, tell themselves they are free from such bias.

Studies of Cognitive Dissonance in Physicians
Physicians have a desire to see themselves as altruistic, guided in their actions by
a desire to serve their patients’ best interests. A number of investigators have
studied how doctors, when they are receiving a payment or a gift from a
pharmaceutical company, resolve the cognitive dissonance that may arise.
In a survey of obstetricians and gynecologists, Morgan and colleagues found that
the majority thought it was ethical to accept free drug samples (92%), a free
informational lunch (77%), or a well-paid consultancy (53%). They reasoned that
the free sample would be helpful to patients in financial need (or provide added
convenience), and only a third thought that their prescribing habits would be
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influenced by the free samples. However, they did worry about their peers; they
were more likely to conclude that the “average doctor’s prescribing would be
influenced by acceptance of the items than their own.”16
Similarly, in a survey of residents at a university-based program, Steinman found
that 61% thought that their prescribing patterns would not be influenced by the
free gifts, yet thought only 16% of “other physicians” would be immune to such
freebies. Moreover, with this self-image in mind, a majority of the residents found it
“appropriate” to accept free lunches, dinner lectures, reprinted articles, pens,
textbooks, and even to go on a free “social outing.” The residents, Steinman
concluded, “believe they are not influenced” by gifts from industry.17
The experts in a field, including key opinion leaders, may be even more certain of
their “objectivity” while they have financial ties to industry. Choudhry surveyed 192
authors of 44 clinical practice guidelines endorsed by North American and
European societies on common adult diseases, and found that 87% had ties to a
drug company. On average, they had financial associations (e.g., honoraria,
consulting, research funding), with more than 10 companies. Nearly two-thirds of
the authors (64%) served as speakers for drug companies, and 59% had
relationships with the companies whose drugs were considered in the guideline
they wrote. Yet, only 7% of the authors thought that their financial ties to
pharmaceutical companies “influenced” their recommendations, and only a slightly
higher number—19%—thought their co-authors were so influenced. In other words,
more than 80% of the experts were confident that the very involved financial
relationships of the members of their group with pharmaceutical companies did
not influence the clinical practice guidelines they produced.18
Chimonas and colleagues, in a study of the thought processes that physicians
employ to manage such “cognitive inconsistencies,” found that they regularly
involved various forms of denial and rationalization. “They avoided thinking about
16

M. Morgan, J. Dana, G. Loewenstein, et al. “Interactions of Doctors with the Pharmaceutical Industry,”

Journal of Medical Ethics 32.10 (2006): 559-562.
17

M. Steinman, M. Shlipak, and S. McPhee, “Of Principles and Pens: Attitudes and Practices of Medicine

Housestaff toward Pharmaceutical Industry Promotions,” American Journal of Medicine 110.7 (2001): 551-557.
18

Niteesh Choudhry, Henry Thomas Stelfox, Allan S. Detsky , “Relationships Between Authors of Clinical

Practice Guidelines and the Pharmaceutical Industry,” Journal of the American Medical Association 287.5
(2002): 612-617.
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the conflict of interest, they disagreed that industry relationships affected physician
behavior, they denied responsibility for the problem, they enumerated techniques
for remaining impartial, and they reasoned that meetings with detailers were
educational and benefited patients” Chimonas wrote.19 The physicians’ methods
for resolving the conflict may have varied, but typically the end thought was the
same: It was okay to accept free gifts because they would remain objective, even
though others might be biased by such conflicts.
This self-image of physicians, noted former APA President Paul Appelbaum, is so
strong that for many doctors even “the suggestion that they may be influenced by
contact with the pharmaceutical or device industries is infuriating.” As physicians
receive money and gifts from pharmaceutical companies, they need to see
themselves as remaining objective, acting in the best interests of their patients,
and it is an affront to suggest otherwise.20 “For social psychologists who study the
difficulties that people have recognizing how other parties influence their behavior,
physicians’ failure to appreciate the impact of relationships with industry merely
makes physicians like everyone else,” Appelbaum wrote.21
Finally, as Cain observed, researchers have found that “it is difficult to overcome
the influence of early information on beliefs.” Thus, it may be that once physicians
have concluded that they are not influenced by financial payments or gifts from
pharmaceutical companies, they may then be reluctant to accept any information—
such as evidence that the conflicts led to biased behavior—that would diminish
their confidence in their objectivity. This hardening of beliefs is also true when
other types of conflicts of interest are present, Cain said. “Physicians may have
many relationships that result in bias other than those involving pharmaceutical

19

Susan Chimonas, Troyen A. Brennan, David J. Rothman, “Physicians and Drug Representatives: Exploring

the Dynamics of the Relationship,” Journal of General Internal Medicine 22.2 (2007): 184-190.
20

Belonging to a professional organization has licensing and rationalization effects of this nature. See

Maryam Kouchaki, ”Professionalism and Moral Behavior: Does a Professional Self-Conception Make One More
Unethical?” Edmond J. Safra Research Lab Working Papers, No. 4 (2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243811.
21

Paul S. Appelbaum and Azgad Gold, “Psychiatrists’ Relationships with Industry: The Principal-Agent

Problem,” Harvard Review of Psychiatry 18.5 (2010): 255-265.
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companies, including nonfinancial conflicts of interest. Such bias may be difficult
to undo.”22

Under the Influence of Guild Interests
Scholars studying conflicts of interest within medicine usually focus on the
influence of pharmaceutical money on academic physicians and the rest of the
profession. Less attention is paid to guild interests, even though this influence may
be more profound than financial payments from pharmaceutical companies.
In 1980, after the APA adopted a “medical model” for classifying mental disorders,
the field was left with three main “products”: research, the classification of mental
disorders, and the prescribing of psychiatric drugs. Thus, the APA, as an
organization, was taken off course by a growing dependency on drug firms and by
internal interests (e.g., guild interests) and external influences (e.g., third party
reimbursement practices incentivizing psychiatrists to act as
psychopharmacologists rather than talk therapists). These factors led psychiatrists
in the U.S. to effectively cede psychotherapy to to other mental health
professionals, such as psychologists and social workers. All medical disciplines
have an interest in maintaining a belief in their therapies, and this is certainly true
in psychiatry. However, there are no biological markers for any mental disorders—
there are no scanning techniques or blood tests to determine if someone has
Schizophrenia or Bipolar Disorder. The absence of biological markers renders
psychiatry more vulnerable than other medical subspecialties to implicit bias and
industry influence. In turn, this reliance on subjective interpretations can result in
an overestimation of the benefits of drugs and an underestimate of harm. Indeed,
the prescribing of drugs has become central to what a psychiatrist does. As Detsky
noted, such guild interests can lead to a “form of bias [that] comes from the way
you make your living.”23

22

Daylian Cain andAllan Detsky, “Everyone’s a Little Bit Biased (Even Physicians),” Journal of the American

Medical Association 299.24 (2008): 2893-95.
23

Allan S. Detsky, “Sources of Bias for Authors of Clinical Practice Guidelines,” Canadian Medical Association

Journal 175.9 (2006): 1033.
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Given these guild interests and external pressures (e.g. market pressures,
insurance and managed care practices), it is easy to understand the tendency to
dismiss certain research results. Research results that raise questions about the
efficacy or safety of a class of drugs or findings from naturalistic studies that
unmedicated patients did better over the long term, would provoke cognitive
dissonance within the field. The APA as an organization, as well as leaders within
the field, would be motivated to dismiss those results, or critique them in a way
that would protect their own as well as a societal belief in the medications.
Moreover, this guild influence is likely going to be more hidden to the conscious
mind than the influence due to a payment from a drug company. In the latter
instance, there is a general societal understanding that such a situation does
present a conflict of interest, which can lead to bias, and thus there is some
conscious awareness that such payments may be a problem. But society is less
aware that a guild interest may lead to biased judgment, and that is true of
physicians too. Physicians’ professional identity is predicated on the assumption
that their treatment choices are evidence-based, and thus psychiatrists are not
going to think that they may be motivated by a guild interest to protect societal
belief in psychiatric medications.

Cognitive Dissonance Within Psychiatry
It is easy to see instances of cognitive dissonance at work in the public responses
by the APA and academic psychiatrists to criticisms of psychiatric medications, or
to studies revealing that leading psychiatrists have conflicts of interests. Their
responses regularly tell of an endorsement for pharmacotherapy and assertions
that researchers are unaffected by commercial ties, rather than a willingness to
engage with the findings that question the risk benefit ratio of psychotropic
medications.
For instance, in 2008, Irving Kirsch and colleagues conducted a meta-analysis of
the clinical trial data submitted to the Food and Drug Administration for four
antidepressants, and he grouped drug versus placebo results according to how
severely ill the patients were at the beginning of the study. He found that the drugs
did not provide a clinically meaningful benefit to most patients with depression. It
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was only in the very severely ill that the drugs provided this benefit, according to
the clinical trial results.24
Two years later, Fournier came to a similar conclusion. In many clinical trials, the
drug companies use a washout period (i.e., the elimination of initial placebo
responders), a trial design that is expected to suppress the placebo response.
Fournier et al. conducted a meta-analysis of clinical trials that randomized patients
either to placebo or drug (regardless of whether they initially responded to the
placebo), and they also included information about the severity of the patients’
symptoms in the trial. Fournier and colleagues were able to find only six such
studies in the literature, and in those six studies, “true drug effects—an advantage
of antidepressant over placebo—were nonexistent to negligible among depressed
patients with mild, moderate and even severe baseline symptoms, whereas they
were large for patients with very severe symptoms.”25
In response to Kirsch’s and Fournier’s findings, psychiatrist Peter Kramer, author
of Listening to Prozac, wrote an op-ed in the New York Times titled “In Defense of
Antidepressants.”26 These drugs, Kramer wrote, “work—ordinarily well, on a par
with other medications [that] doctors prescribe.”24 He interpreted the dispiriting
results that Kirsch’s analysis found on several factors, stating, for instance, that
pharmaceutical companies “run quick, sloppy trials.” Often, he added, “subjects
who don’t have really have depression are included – and (no surprise) weeks down
the road they are not depressed.” However, 34 of the 35 industry-funded trials
reviewed by Kirsch enrolled only severely depressed patients—but Kramer’s op-ed
told the public a different “truth”: the studies were poorly run, they enrolled the
wrong patients, and that is why the drugs often failed to beat placebo. As for
Fournier et al’s research, Kramer stated that critics questioned “aspects of
[Fournier’s] math,”24 which subtly implied—without any substantiating evidence—
that the results from their meta-analysis may not have been correct.

24

Irving Kirsch, Brett J. Deacon, Tania B. Huedo-Medina, et al., “Initial Severity and Antidepressant Benefits:

A Meta-Analysis of Data Submitted to the Food and Drug Administration,” PLoS Medicine 5 (2008): 260-268.
25

Jay C. Fournier, Robert J. DeRubeis, Steven D. Hollon, et al., “Antidepressant Drug Effects and Depression

Severity,” Journal of the American Medical Association 303.1 (2010):47-53.
26

Peter D. Kramer, “In Defense of Antidepressants,” New York Times, July 9, 2011.
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What was missing from Kramer’s defense of antidepressants was any substantive
engagement with the findings by Kirsch and Fournier. Instead, in his op-ed piece
one sees the arguments of someone who knows that antidepressants “work” for all
subsets of depressed patients, and thus discounts evidence to the contrary. It
appears that Kirsch’s and Fournier’s results provoked a moment of cognitive
dissonance, but by the finish of his op-ed piece, Kramer may have resolved that
dissonance. “In the end, the much heralded overview analyses look to be editorials
with numbers attached,”24
Another example of such cognitive dissonance can be seen in the response of the
APA to a two-part essay that Marcia Angell, former editor of the New England
Journal of Medicine, wrote in the New York Review of Books.27 In her 2011 review,
Angell discussed Kirsch’s study of antidepressants, and she also wrote about the
troubling long-term effects of psychiatric drugs. Rather than discuss the science,
the APA responded by attacking the messenger (Angell.) “We regret that a more
balanced approach was not taken,” the APA wrote in a letter to the New York Review
of Books.) “The bottom line is that these medications often relieve the patient’s
suffering, and this is why doctors prescribe them.”28 In an article in Psychiatric
News, APA president John Oldham added, “there is a lot of very bad distortion (in
Angell’s review) for someone with her stature to be promoting.”29
The APA responded in a similar vein when Lisa Cosgrove and Sheldon Krimsky
reported that a high percentage of the members of the panels that developed
clinical practice guidelines for schizophrenia, bipolar, and depression had financial
ties to pharmaceutical companies. Rather than engage in the possibility that this
conflict might influence their recommendations, the APA said there was no reason
to worry that this would be so. “There is this assumption that a tie with a company
is evidence of bias,” said Darrel Regier, research director for the APA, in an
interview with USA Today. “But these people can be objective.”30

27

Marcia Angell, “The Epidemic of Mental Illness: Why?,” The New York Review of Books, June 23, 2011, and

Marcia Angell, “The Illusions of Psychiatry,” The New York Review of Books, July 14, 2011.
28

J. Oldham, “Letter to the Editor,” New York Review of Books, August 18, 2011.

29

Mark Moran, “Prominent M.D.’s Book Reviews Give Negative Views of Psychiatry,” Psychiatric News 46.15

(2011).
30

M. Elias, “Conflicts of Interest Bedevil Psychiatric Drug Research,” USA Today, June 3, 2009.
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In short, the response by the APA and other leading psychiatrists to criticism that
challenged guild interests has been this: psychiatric drugs work quite well, better
than suggested by the clinical data, and the leaders in the field are expert
scientists, unaffected by their financial ties to industry. Studies of cognitive
dissonance reveal is that the APA and its leaders are quite certain that that all
classes of psychotropic medications are effective and safe. Furthermore, emerging
evidence that suggests otherwise must be of poor quality or simply wrong.

Medical Consequences
Conflicts of interest can affect all aspects of psychiatry’s medical practices. In
research, it can lead researchers to make design and methodological choices that
may overemphasize the effectiveness of the drugs and minimize the adverse
events. In the delineation of diagnostic categories, it can lead to an expansion of
the boundaries of disorders—or to the creation of new disorders—in ways that
promote industry interests. Finally, it can lead the field to believe that it is
practicing “evidence based medicine,” with the clinical care guidelines thought to
reflect the findings of honest science, when, in fact, the evidence base is “tainted”
in multiple ways.
The first problem is that the published literature—which the experts rely on to
develop the guidelines—may be compromised by financial conflicts of interest. If
so, the guidelines will be compromised as a matter of course: bad input leads to
bad output. The second problem is that the experts developing the guidelines may
have a financial conflict of interest (if they have received payments from drug
companies), and they will also have a “guild” interest to see the drugs in a positive
light. Thus, as they review the literature, they will have a natural “confirmatory
bias” to perceive study results in a manner that reflects their belief that the
medications are quite helpful. Indeed, researchers have found that expert opinion
on medical subjects is very unreliable and often contradicts scientific data.31
The end result may be clinical care guidelines that lead to the overuse, or
inappropriate use, of psychiatric medications. It is easy to argue that is the case
31
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with antidepressants. Kirsch’s and Fournier’s work reveal that SSRIs do not provide
a clinically meaningful benefit to patients with mild to moderate depression.
Indeed, the National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) in Britain, which acts as
an advisory group to the National Health Service, came to that very conclusion,
precisely because of the documented risk/benefit ratio. NICE thus explicitly states
that antidepressants should not be a first line therapy for patients with mild to
moderate depression.32 In contrast to guidelines produced by NICE as well as
recent Dutch guidelines for Major Depressive Disorder, the APA’s most recent
guideline for Major Depressive Disorder recommended antidepressants as a frontline intervention for mild to moderate depression.33 All of the APA’s guideline
development group had ties to pharmaceutical companies, and a majority served
on speakers bureaus (sometimes referred to as “key opinion leaders”) for
manufacturers of the antidepressant medications.
The concept of “evidence-based medicine” provides a medical discipline with the
sense that its treatment protocols are grounded in unbiased, objective science.
However, the reality may be very different. Bias may be at work at every step of this
process, from the generating of the evidence to the analysis of the literature, and
that can lead to treatment guidelines that are profoundly compromised. Gupta,
(2003), sums up this point well: “The practice of EBM could then lead to worse
rather than better patient care. Furthermore, EBM may have unwanted effects…
and may deepen the influence of private interests, at the expense of patient
interests, in determining what services are made available.”34

Solutions
What, then, are possible solutions to the pervasive conflicts of interest present in
psychiatry today? What this brief review of cognitive dissonance theory shows us is
that today’s preferred solution—disclosure of ties to pharmaceutical companies—is
32
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no solution at all. The conflict is still there, and there is research that suggests that
disclosure, rather than serve as a remedy against bias, may worsen it.35 Having
“come clean,” researchers may become more convinced than ever that they are not
biased or influenced by such ties.
Therefore, as our society searches for solutions, it will likely need to look for ways
to eliminate the conflicts of interest when research is conducted and clinical
guidelines are developed. Indeed, transparency simply “shifts the problem from
one of ‘secrecy of bias’ to ‘openness of bias.’”36 As a gold standard, financial
conflicts of interest need to be prohibited, not “managed.” There should be a
rebuttable presumption of prohibiting financial conflicts of interest among
individuals responsible for developing diagnostic or clinical care guidelines in
psychiatry. Additionally, and in keeping with the Institute of Medicine’s most recent
recommendations, those guideline development groups and research teams who
are responsible for designing and analyzing randomized clinical trials should be
multidisciplinary and include methodologists as well as content experts. A
multidisciplinary team would not be vulnerable to guild interests, and this would
hopefully mitigate the potential for confirmatory and implicit biases to negatively
affect the process of testing new drugs or the development of psychiatric
guidelines.
Finally, the entire medical profession should strive to become more aware of
cognitive dissonance at work within medicine, and how it can lead to biased data
and imbalanced conclusions about the efficacy and safety of medications. All
medical subspecialties, including psychiatry, need to understand that because
conflicts of interest may lead to implicit or unconscious bias, it is necessary to try
to eliminate the conflicts altogether, rather than simply disclose that such conflicts
exist.

35
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